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Abstract 
Intergroup conflict encompasses a broad range of situations with moral relevance. Researchers 
at the intersection of social and moral psychology employ diverse methodologies, including 
surveys, moral dilemmas, economic games, and neuroimaging, to study how individuals think, 
feel, and act in intergroup moral encounters. We review recent research pertaining to four types 
of intergroup moral encounters: (a) value-expressive and identity-expressive endorsements of 
conflict-related actions and policies; (b) helping and harming in-group and out-group members; 
(c) reacting to transgressions committed by in-group or out-group members; and (d) reacting to 
the suffering of in-group or out-group members. Overall, we explain how sacred values, social 
motives, group-based moral emotions, and the physiological processes underlying them, shape 
moral behavior in intergroup conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morality in Intergroup Conflict 3 
 
December 16, 2014: As we are writing this article, CNN reports that Taliban militants 
slaughtered more than 140 children and their teachers in Peshawar, Pakistan. Terrorism, war, 
and genocide pervade the lives of millions of people throughout the world, spreading suffering 
and destruction. What motivates individuals to fight, kill, and die on behalf of groups? How do 
sacred values, moral emotions, and their underlying physiology, shape intergroup conflict? In 
recent years, scientists at the intersection of social and moral psychology have begun to provide 
answers to these theoretically and practically important questions.  
Intergroup conflict encompasses a broad range of situations with moral relevance. The 
current review is organized around four types of moral encounters embedded in the context of 
intergroup conflict: (a) value-expressive and identity-expressive endorsements of conflict-
related actions and policies; (b) helping and harming in-group and out-group members; (c) 
reacting to transgressions committed by in-group or out-group members; and (d) reacting to the 
suffering of in-group or out-group members. Addressing these four types of moral encounters, 
we discuss how sacred values, social motives, moral emotions, and the physiological processes 
underlying them, shape moral behavior in intergroup conflict. 
Researchers use a diverse set of methodologies to study these distinct types of moral 
encounters. Research on value-expressive endorsements of actions and policies often surveys 
members of natural groups engaged in violent real-world conflict. Research on identity-
expressive moral behavior typically elicits responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. Research 
on helping and harming in-group and out-group members usually establishes ad-hoc 
experimental groups and employs economic games in which group members choose how to 
allocate their resources. Finally, research on reactions to transgressions by in-group or out-
group members, as well as the suffering of in-group or out-group members, often uses self-
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report measures of emotional experiences alongside neuroimaging techniques. Our brief review 
cuts across these diverse methodologies. 
Value-Expressive and Identity-Expressive Endorsements of Actions and Policies  
Sacred values operate as moral imperatives that delineate which conflict-related actions 
and policies are right versus wrong, which, in turn, constrain and direct individual support for 
these actions and policies [1]. For example, individuals’ support of war depends on their 
perceptions of the righteousness of armed violence, rather than the strategic efficacy of warfare 
[2]. In addition, people react with moral outrage when offered payment for self-sacrificial 
behavior during intergroup conflict, or when asked to consider tradeoffs between sacred and 
non-sacred issues in intergroup negotiation [3]. The power of sacred values is not lost on savvy 
groups, whose leaders use sacred values to motivate group members’ self-sacrificial behavior 
and win public support for their cause [4]. Indeed, most suicide attacks are committed by 
insurgent organizations that use religious values and political messages in tandem to increase 
popular support [5].  
Self-sacrifice has also been conceptualized as identity-expressive behavior. Individuals 
report willingness to self-sacrifice to save fellow group members when their fear of death is 
mitigated by strong feelings of embeddedness in the group [6,7]. For example, fused 
individuals—those whose personal identity completely overlaps with their group identity—
express greater willingness to self-sacrifice for fellow in-group members in classic trolley 
dilemmas. This willingness generalizes to members of extended in-groups, but not to out-group 
members [8]. When facing information about threat to fellow in-group members, strongly fused 
individuals experience negative emotions as if they themselves were under threat, and 
intuitively and swiftly express willingness to protect the group [9]. Linking the value-expressive 
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and identity-expressive accounts of self-sacrificial behavior, research shows that encouraging 
fused individuals to believe that members of their group share certain core characteristics, such 
as genes or values, leads them to perceive familial ties with fellow in-group members, which, in 
turn, triggers a sense of duty to self-sacrifice to protect group members from harm [10].  
Helping and Harming “Us” and “Them” 
When group members participate in intergroup conflict, they invest time and effort, and 
risk injury or death on behalf of their group. Individuals can direct these costly contributions 
toward helping fellow in-group members, harming out-group members, or both. They can also 
direct their contributions toward helping out-group members. Research using economic games 
has found that, faced with a choice to help in-group members either with or without harming 
out-group members, most individuals prefer to help in-group members without harming out-
group members [11]. In addition, helping in-group members without harming out-group 
members is rewarded with higher social status than helping in-group members while also 
harming out-group members [12]. Interestingly, groups reward parochial helping more than 
universal helping: Individuals who help fellow in-group members are conferred higher status 
than those who use their resources to help both in-group and out-group members [13]. Despite 
the robust preference for “in-group love” over “out-group hate”, certain aggravating conditions 
spur harm to out-groups. For example, interactions with morality-based out-groups, such as the 
members of a fascist political party, have been shown to increase resource allocations aimed at 
harming out-group members [14]. 
Recent research documented the influence of hormones on intergroup behavior, with a 
particular focus on oxytocin, a hormone best known for its role in childbirth and social bonding. 
For example, compared with individuals receiving placebo, individuals receiving oxytocin (self-
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administered using intranasal spray) allocate more resources to benefit fellow in-group 
members and protect their in-group, but show no difference in resource allocation aimed at 
harming out-group members [15]. In a similar vein, individuals administered oxytocin show 
greater intergroup bias [16], an effect driven primarily by a heightened concern for and 
cooperation with in-group members, rather than antagonism for and competition against out-
group members [17]. Oxytocin has also been shown to increase group-serving—but not self-
serving—unethical behavior, such as cheating [18].  
The effects of oxytocin on intergroup behavior depend on the intergroup context. In 
highly cooperative intergroup contexts, individuals who received oxytocin were more likely to 
benefit both in-group and out-group members [19]. In contrast, in highly competitive intergroup 
contexts, individuals who received oxytocin preferred to form an alliance with threatening in-
group members, who were seen as capable of harming others and hence as useful allies in 
intergroup conflict, rather than with non-threatening in-group members [20].     
Reactions to Transgressions by “Us” and “Them” 
Moral group-based emotions arise when group or intergroup events activate individuals’ 
perceptions of right or wrong. Transgressions committed in the context of intergroup conflict 
often trigger group-based anger and guilt [21,22]. Individuals experience group-based anger in 
reaction to goal blocking and perceived injustice [23,24]. In turn, group-based anger prompts 
various action tendencies, which can be either destructive (consistent with anger’s negative 
valence) or constructive (consistent with anger’s approach orientation) [23]. Individuals who 
experience group-based anger show stronger support for retaliation [25], but also report greater 
willingness to engage in risky, non-aggressive political negotiations [22] and elicit stronger 
empathic responses from out-group members [26]. Evidence suggests that anger becomes 
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destructive in the presence of other negative, avoidance-oriented emotions such as group-based 
hatred [23] or group-based contempt [26,27].  
Individuals experience group-based guilt when they perceive that their group is 
responsible for a moral transgression. Guilt is intensified when group members believe that their 
group should and can make amends to restore justice. Taking responsibility for a moral 
transgression is potentially threatening to one’s collective identity. One way to attenuate this 
threat is by self-affirming aspects of one’s identity that are unrelated to the threatened aspect. 
Indeed, research in Israel and Bosnia found that self-affirmation increased individuals’ 
willingness to acknowledge in-group responsibility for moral transgressions, their feelings of 
group-based guilt, and support for reparation policies [28]. In addition to increasing support for 
reparation [29], group-based guilt also increases people’s willingness to make symbolic 
gestures, such as apologizing for wrongdoing [30].  
Group-based hope can increase individuals’ support for actions aimed at resolving 
seemingly intractable intergroup conflict. Individuals experience group-based hope when they 
believe that their group’s current situation is malleable and will change for the better [31]. 
Perceptions of malleability negatively predict aggression and positively predict support for 
education over punishment [32,33]. Group-based hope in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict positively predicted individuals’ willingness to make concessions [32] and their 
acquisition of information in favor of conflict resolution [34]. Group-based hope also increases 
support for humanitarian aid, even during times of war [35], and facilitates intergroup 
forgiveness [36].  
Reactions to the Suffering of In-group and Out-group Members 
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People show less empathy toward the suffering of out-group members as compared with 
in-group members, in part because they dehumanize out-group members [37]. Given people’s 
social desirability concerns and reticence to self-report these thoughts and feelings, researchers 
have utilized implicit measures—neural, hormonal, and physiological—that are indicative of 
people’s emotional reactions to the suffering of in-group and out-group members [38]. For 
example, people who see needles pricking in-group members’ hands, but not out-group 
members’, experience a sensorimotor pain response. Response to the pain of uncategorized 
targets is weaker than to in-group pain but stronger than (the non-existent response) to out-
group pain [39]. People who show this intergroup empathy gap are also less willing to help and 
more willing to harm out-group members. For instance, individuals show deficits in empathy, 
and even schadenfreude (taking pleasure in others’ pain), toward rivals of groups with which 
they identify but to which they do not belong; these schadenfreude responses, in turn, prompt 
intentions to aggress against these targets [40]. 
This intergroup empathy gap is a complex phenomenon moderated by social and cultural 
contexts, and thus changes from one intergroup context to the next [41]. The bias is stronger 
among individuals who strongly endorse social hierarchy (e.g., Koreans vs. Caucasian 
Americans [42]); belong to low-status groups; or strongly identify with their group [43]. It also 
depends on stereotype content: Envied targets (i.e., low warmth, high competence) elicit more 
bias (i.e., less sympathy) than disgusting targets (i.e. low warmth, low competence) or pitied 
targets (i.e. high warmth, low competence) [44,45]. 
Consistent with the moderating role of socio-cultural contexts, fMRI studies show that 
the intergroup empathy gap is associated with brain areas implicated in cognition, rather than 
the more affective “pain matrix” (i.e., the anterior cingulate cortex and insula). Whereas 
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empathy for an uncategorized target activates the pain matrix, the difference in activation in 
response to the suffering of an in-group member versus an out-group member is observed in 
cognitive areas, including the medial prefrontal cortex [43] and left temporo-parietal junction 
[42]. Thus, in-group-bounded empathy may have distinct psychological underpinnings that 
differ from the affective processes underlying generalized empathy.   
Neuropsychological methods have also illuminated how intergroup contexts weaken the 
activation of people’s individual moral standards. For example, when people process moral 
stimuli in a group context, they show reduced activation in social-cognitive brain areas 
associated with self-reflection [46]. The same people who show these lower levels of activation, 
in turn, subsequently engage in more intergroup antisocial behavior, suggesting that losing 
touch with one’s own moral standards facilitates intergroup aggression. 
Conclusion 
To understand and predict individual moral behavior in intergroup conflict, we need to 
understand the interplay between people’s social motives, identities and emotions, as well as the 
underlying neural and hormonal processes that drive them. We have reviewed research on each 
of these determinants; considering how they interact with each other would enhance our 
understanding of human behavior in moral encounters embedded within intergroup conflict.  
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